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NOTES
PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Critics of the jury system have long argued that certain
reforms must be made in order to improve and preserve
this instrument of justice. Among the changes which could
streamline the practice are the special verdict, pre-trial
discovery procedure, a return to oral instruction, special
juries, and comment on the evidence.1
Pattern jury instructions represent yet another attempt
to improve the jury system, by serving as a guide or model
for the bench and bar in jury trials. The idea was born in
an article written in 1935 by Judge William J Palmer of the
Los Angeles County Superior Court, in which he lamented
that many hours and days were wasted in duplicated effort
in drawing up jury instructions for each trial. He closed his
article by suggesting that much of this time could be saved
if there existed a set of approved jury instructions, available
to all trial lawyers. 2 Two years later Judge Palmer was
asked to undertake the editing of just such a collection, and
in 1938 there appeared the first edition of California Jury
Instructions-Civil,3 which has been acclaimed for its excel-
lence and scope. 4 The spirit and philosophy of this work is
to try to avoid any mechanical rigidity in order to serve as
a model, much like a dressmaker's pattern, to be shaped
by the trial judge and counsel to fit the facts of each case.5
In 1941 the District of Columbia Bar Association followed
1. See FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 141-45 (1963), Wright, The Invasion of
The Jury Temperature of The War, 27 TEMPLE L.Q. 137 (1953) Wright, In-
structions to The Jury* Summary Without Comment, 1954 WASH. UNIV. L. Q.
177 Wright, Adequecy of Instructions to The Jury:I, 53 MICH. L. REv. 505
(1955) JOINER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE JURY (1962).
2. Palmer, History of An Adventure with Pattern Jury Instructions, CALI-
FORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL, 1 BAJI 35 (4th ed. 1956).
3. Id., 36-38 (commonly called the Book of Approved Jury Instructions-
BAJI).
4. See Winslow, The Instruction Ritual, 13 HASTINGS L. J. 456 (1962), for
a personal appraisal by a trial judge who uses BAJI.
5. Palmer, Patterns For Jury Instructions, 29 CAN. BAR REV. 256 (1951).
See Panel Discussion Part III Instructing The Jury, 47 CAL. L. REV. 888 (1959).
suit with its own set of suggested instructions.6 At present
nine states have jury instructions in one form or another,
and four more have committees at work on such a project.7
The apparent popularity of pattern jury instructions, and the
possibility that North Dakota may follow suit, have led to this
report.
II
The reasons given for the adoption of pattern jury
instructions vary from state to state, and in order of im-
portance; but generally there are five: accuracy, time
savings, impartiality, intelligibility, uniformity
Accuracy is the most important reason for the use of
approved instructions. 8  The needless cost and unnecessary
delay caused by a reversal and a new trial are largely
eliminated by the use of this device. 9 A survey of California
negligence cases showed that during a two-year period there
were seventeen reversals out of two hundred fifty decisions,
while in Missouri in the same period the number of reversals
based on faulty instructions was fifty-one out of two hundred
fifty 10 Over a twenty-five year period in Illinois, thirty-eight
percent of the judgments were reversed where the instructions
were challenged. 1 Another recent survey of California appel-
late cases reveals a seven percent rate of reversals in cases
where the instructions were in issue.12
That pattern jury instructions are time-saving can hardly
be denied; indeed, this was the reason which prompted them
in the first place. 3 Unslanted, impartial and brief instruc-
6. REVISED STANDARDIZED JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
at xi. (Rev. ed. 1963).
7. See Committee Report on Jury Instructions, 17 ARK. L. REV. 328, and
MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW 434 (1963) for enumerations. The
Federal courts do not have a uniform system of pattern instructions, but several
sets of forms have been suggested from time to time by Hon. William C. Mathes,
Judge for the So. Dist. of Cal. See. 3 F.R.D. 118 (1944) 20 F.R.D. 231 (1958)
22 F.R.D. 127 (1959) 27 F.R.D. 39 (1961) , 28 F.R.D. 401 (1962) 223 F
Supp. at XXXI (1963).
8. 1 BAJI 44 (4th ed. 1956).
9. See Snyder, Pattern Jury Instructions, 20 Mo. B. J. 53, 58-59 (1964).
10. White, Standardized Instructions, 23 U. KAN. CITY L. REV. 179, 183 (1954-
55).
11. Corboy Instructing Jurors In Civil Cases. 8 DEPAUL L. REV. 141 (1959).
This article is a progress report of the Illinois Supreme Court Committee on
Pattern Jury Instructions, and contains a description of the Committee's work
schedule.
12. Ibid.
13. Supra note 2.
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tions are fairer to the litigants; 14  and by their use, the
number of peremptory instructions, which have been strongly
criticised, 15 can be reduced or eliminated. Another reason
is the possibility of making the instructions easier to under-
stand, a necessity if the jury system is to function properly 16
Finally, there is the advantage of uniformity, which has been
considered important enough in Illinois and Missouri to
warrant the adoption of mandatory instructions.11  In
California the forms are not compulsory, but the language of
BAJI is substantially followed in most cases. 18
III
The working theory of pattern instructions is very simple.
Where they are not compulsory, the forms are supposed to be
the basis upon which a trial judge may formulate his own
set of instructions.1 9 Accuracy is aided by the annotations
to each instruction, citing cases wherein the language has
been quoted with approval.2 0 The California system is
structured like a set of building blocks, using a number of
abstract definitions, knitted together by an issue instruction
which refers back to the definition.2 1  The flexibility of this
method is supposed to give enough variations to fit each case.
In Illinois and Missouri the instructions are compulsory and
must be followed in every case where they apply and correctly
state the law Failure to do so has been held to be reversible
error in Illinois. 2 The aims of the Illinois committee were
that the instructions should be conversational, understandable,
unslanted and accurate. 23  Where the book does not contain
an instruction on the point of law needed, the Committee has
14. See generally, Guerra v. Handlery Hotels, Inc., 53 Cal. 2d 266, 347 P.2d
674, 677 (1959), and Texaco Country Club v. Wade, 163 S.W.2d 219, 222-23 (Tex.
1942). See also Soper, The Charge to The Jury, 1 F.R.D. 540, 545 (1941).
15. See Scerrlno v. Dunlap, 14 Ill. App. 2d 355, 144 N.E.2d 859 (1957), and
Randal v. Deka, 10 Ill. App. 2d 10, 134 N.E.2d 36 (1956).
16. Supra note 10.
17. See. Illinois Supreme Court Rules, 25-1, and Missouri Supreme Court
Rules, 70.01.
18. Winslow, The Instruction Ritual, 13 HASTINGS L. J. 456 (1962). See Reed
V. Stroh, 54 Cal. App. 2d 183, 128 P.2d 829 (1942), in which the Court urges
that Instructions conform to BAJI.
19. See generally, Panel Discussion Part II Instructing The Jury, supra
note 5, and BRAND, Preface, MINNESOTA JURY INsTRucTION GumEs--JIG (1963).
20. See, e.g., 1 BAJI 51 (4th ed. 1956), and IPI 7 (1961).
21. See Winslow, The Instruction Ritual, 13 HASTINGS I J. 456 (1962). See,
e.g., 1 BAJI 252-282 (4th ed. 1956) for the possibilities of "proximate cause."
22. Zeller v. Durham, 33 Ill. App. 2d 273, 179 N.E.2d 34 (1962).
23. See Snyder, Pattern Jury Instructions, 20 Mo. B. J. 53 (1964).
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NOTES
prescribed that the instruction drafted by the trial judge shall
follow the same pattern which it has used. It has even gone
as far as recommending that certain instructions not be
given.
24
In each state which has a set of pattern jury instructions,
a standing committee remains constantly at work revising,
simplifying, and expanding their work. Regular revisions,
annual pocket parts, and loose-leaf supplements are necessary
features of the system. The drafting committees vary from
state to state in composition, but all committees consist of
judges, practitioners for both plaintiffs and defendants, and
law professors. 25
IV
The decision of whether or not North Dakota needs pattern
jury instructions will depend upon a consideration of all the
relevant factors. An analysis of one of these is set out in the
chart below, which is a survey of all the cases decided in
the Supreme Court of North Dakota from 1953 to 1963:
60-120 N. W 2d
North Dakota cases ........................................................ 586
Appeals from jury verdicts ............................................ 154
Challenges to the instructions ------------------------------------ 61
Refusal of instructions was error ............................ 3
New trials affirm ed ........................................................ 2
Faulty instructions not prejudicial ............................ 7
Faulty instructions held prejudicial ............................ 13
Thus, in the period of ten years, the use of pattern jury
instructions would have helped in twenty-two cases,2 6 and
might have affected the outcome of fifteen. It is a relevant
question, then, whether the bench and bar wish to devote the
necessary five years of hard work to influence such a small
number of cases.
V
The idea and practice of pattern jury instructions has
24. See, e.g., IPI 122 (1961).
25. The membership of each drafting committee is set out in the preface of
each collection.
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not escaped criticism. And though the critics are not as
numerous as the advocates, they have been more articulate
and persuasive.
Proponents of pattern instructions claim that the quality
of abstractness toward which they aim in drafting is an
advantage.2 7 Yet, according to the leading authorities on the
subject of semantics, the mind does not work in a manner
which would enable it to assimilate an abstract definition.
The giving of such instructions assumes that jurors are
capable of learning the meaning of a word like "negligence"
from the definition. 2  But S. I. Hayakawa, an eminent
semanticist, has said, "We learn the meanings of practically
all words (which are, it will be remembered, merely
complicated noises), not from dictionaries, not from defi-
nitions, but from hearing these noises as they accompany
actual situations in life. ",29 Unless jurors can relate the
"complicated noises" of an instruction to some factual context
within their own experience, then the giving of such
instructions is pointless. The cure for this fault would be to
weave the instruction into a summary of the evidence, but
this much debated practice is prohibited in some states, 30 and
prevented by the generalized nature of the pattern instructions
themselves.
That the pattern instructions as they now exist are too
general has caused at least one writer to question their
efficiency David Mellinkoff, of the California Bar, argues
that "The form instruction is gobbledygook partly because
it tries to cover too much, once and for all, and for that very
reason it is too cumbersome to be repeated at the places
where it would do the most good." 31 And Judge Frank G.
Swain of the Los Angeles County Superior Court writes that
26. It would be mere speculation to predict whether pattern instructions
would have reduced the number of challenges to instructions in the appealed
cases.
27. See White, Standardized Instructions, 23 U. KAN. CITY L. REV. 179 (r954-
55). (The term "abstract" is used here to mean unconnected with the facts
from which the definition is drawn.) But see State v. Thompson, 10 Utah 113,
170 P.2d 153, 162 (1946), in which the Court said, "We have repeatedly criti-
cized the giving of abstract statements of law to the jury," and Chesnut, In-
structiois to The Jury, 3 F.R.D. 113 (1944).
28. Supra note 4.
29. HAYAKAWA, LANGUAGE IN THOUGHT AND ACTION 57 (1949)
30: See generally Wright, Instructions to The Jury Summary Without Com-
ment, 1954 WASH. UNIV. L. Q. 177.
31. MELLINKOFF, supra note 7.
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he once read a set of sixteen instructions to a freshman class
at the University of Southern California School of Law Then
he passed out a mimeographed questionnaire and asked the
class to answer it. Not one student passed the test.32
In many states the judge reads his written charge to the
jury The purpose of this practice is threefold - to incorpo-
rate the instructions into the record, to provide a copy for
the jury, and to allow counsel to make timely objections.3 3
Pattern instructions cater to this requirement, and, indeed,
sometimes the judge merely reads his charge directly from
the form book. Whatever meaning the legal language of the
instructions may have for the jury disappears when it is read
rather than spoken. The Illinois Supreme Court Committee
On Pattern Jury Instructions has recognized this difficulty,
and has attempted to make its pattern instructions "conver-
sational", but to a large degree caution has prevailed, and
they still sound stilted when read aloud.
The most telling criticism of pattern jury instructions
is that they are written by lawyers in legal language. To be
any good at all, the instructions must mean the same thing
to the jury as they do to the judge. Yet this elementary
requirement often conflicts with the paramount desire for
accuracy, and the dispute is usually settled by including
whatever legal language is considered indispensable.3 4 Judge
Robert Winslow of the Los Angeles County Superior Court:
says, "We use terms like 'reasonably prudent person',
'negligence', and 'proximate cause' because we are afraid to
use other terms, not because they are descriptive of a
relationship which must be conveyed to the jury ,,35 It takes
lawyers many years to feel at home with the language of the
profession, largely because it is written, and not spoken freely
Stuart Chase has called it a dead language. 36 Whether or
not this is so, it cannot be denied that laymen view the
language of the law with some suspicion. Brevity is another
aim of the pattern instructions, but even the forms of the
excellent California instructions are written by lawyers for
32. Swain, Common Sense In Jury Trials, 30 CAL. S. B. J. 405, 412 (1955).
33. See N.D. R. Civ. P., Rule 51(a).
34. Supra note 8,
35. Supra note 4, at 463.
36. CHASE, THE POWER OF WORDS 252 (1954).
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lawyers, and their use is neither simple nor brief. In one
California case using the approved forms there were sixty-
nine instructions, fifty-seven of them taken from BAJi,
covering more than thirty-three pages of the record.3 7  The
inordinate length of the charge provoked a concurring opinion
from Presiding Justice Shinn, criticizing the conventional use
of the pattern instructions. He said, "While it is customary
to give these abstruse instructions on proximate cause and
intervening agency, I doubt that they have ever had an effect
upon the mind of an average juror except to confuse him."38
What is lacking is some means of knowing whether the jury
actually understood what they were told. It is a commonplace
that lawyers are uniquely unqualified, by their familiarity
with legal language, to answer this question; and appellate
judges, with only a copy of the record before them, are
equally at a loss. 3 9 Often, the unfortunate result is jury-made
law 40
VI
For any state considering the drafting of a complete set
of pattern jury instructions, there exist several alternatives.
The easiest course is to do nothing. The survey of cases
set out above shows that even though the administration of
justice would be speeded somewhat, the ultimate effect of
the forms would be negligible in North Dakota. And unless
the drafting committee adopts a different procedure and set
of goals, the result would likely be subject to the same
criticisms which have cast doubt upon the existing models.
Or, the committee could imitate those of other states
37. Werkman v. Howard Zink Corp., 97 Cal. App. 2d 418, 218 P.2d 43 (1950).
38. Id., at 50. See also, Swain, Common Sense In Jury Trials, 30 CAL. S. B. J.
405, 412 (1955), "One of the greatest fictions known to the law is that a jury
of twelve laymen can hear a judge read a set of instructions once, then under-
stand them, digest them, and correctly apply them to the facts in the case."
39. See MIELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW 434 (1963), "One ex-
planation of the needless explanations and needless confusion is that many of
these instructions are not designed for the quick understanding of listening lay-
men, but rather for more or less intelligible reading for appellate judges. 'More
or less, because when the instructions have become standardized and common-
place, with pet names like BAlI, I1LI, JIFU, etc., almost all the reviewing judge
need do is hold them up to the light to see if the paragraph indentations and
periods are in the right places. So that he may say' This jury has been instructed.
That speeds the administration of justice, even if the juror understands nothing
of what is said to him. In his confusion he reverts to his somewhat muddled
common sense, and brings in a verdict 'that does not shock the sense of justice."
40. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 120 (1963).
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and start from the beginning. But this would involve a
prodigious amount of time and money It took Illinois five
years to produce its book of instructions, and the Arkansas
committee estimated its cost for two years at ten thousand
dollars, for which it obtained a legislative appropriation.
4 1
And it is possible that the case-law of North Dakota might
be insufficient to supply authority for a complete set of
instructions.
Short of beginning anew, the committee could investigate
the possibility of adopting the best instructions from the form
books already compiled in other states. This approach has
the advantage of being time- and money-saving. Also, the
collection so adopted would be more complete, and would
have been tested in the courts.
The most desirable approach, in the view of this writer,
is for the bench and bar to do what no other state appears
to have considered. The most important feature of this
approach is to have a committee composed of both lawyers
and laymen. By making the drafting of a set of instructions
a cooperative venture, it is far more likely that the forms
would be composed in English rather than some form of
legalese. The difference between the two can be seen by a
comparison of the forms set out below 42 Further, it would
be desirable for the committee to have as one of its draftsmen
a layman with a professional acquaintance with semantics
or linguistics. Instructions on each point could be made short
enough so that there would be a variety for most situations;
and this could lead to the desirable integration of the
instructions and the evidence in the court's charge. Such a
flexible approach would require that the instructions would
not be compulsory There is an additional reason for
suggested, rather than mandatory forms. A committee
drafting compulsory instructions unavoidably takes on the
character of a law revision committee, and the healthy growth
of the law through judicial experimentation is thus prevented
at its inception. 43
41. Committee Report on Jury Instrections, 17 ARK. L. REv. 328 (1963).
42. E.g., 1 BAJI 63 (4th ed. 1956), "In civil actions the party who asserts
the affirmative of an issue must carry the burden of proving it. This means
that if no evidence were given on either side of such issue, your finding as to it
would have to be against that party. When the evidence is contradictory, the
1964] NOTES
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This writer believes that it is possible to draft a set of
jury instructions which would be both clear and accurate.
The fact that none of the committees who have so far
addressed themselves to this great task has accomplished all
its alms is probably due more to their composition and view-
point, rather than to any lack of ability or dedication.
Lawyers should seek the help of the very laymen for whose
ears the pattern jury instructions are ultimately intended.
If this is done, the models can be a useful tool to the attorney
and judge, an aid to the understanding of the juror, and a
means of improving the administration of justice.
RICHARD BOARDMAN
decision must be made according to the preponderance of evidence, by which
is meant such evidence as, when weighed with that opposed to it, has more
convincing force, and from which it results that the greater probability of truth
lies therein. Should the conflicting evidence be evenly balanced in your minds,
so that You are unable to say that the evidence on either side of the issue pre-
ponderates, then your finding must be against the party carrying the burden of
proof, namely, the one who asserts the affirmative of the issue."
IPI 116 (1961), "Vlhen I say that a party has the burden of proof on
any proposition, or use the expression 'if you find', or 'if you decide', I mean
you must be persuaded, considering all the evidence in the case, that the pro-
position on which [he] has the burden of proof is more probably true than
not true."
JIG 42 (1963), "Whenever I say a claim must be proved, I mean that
all of the evidence by whomever produced must lead you to believe it is more
likely that the claim is true than not true. If the evidence does not lead you
to believe it is more likely that the claim is true than not true, then the claim
has not been proved. Proof of a claim does not necessarily mean the great-
er number of witnesses or the greater volume of testimony. Any believable evi-
dence may be a sufficient basis to prove a claim."
See also MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW 433-34 (1963), "The
Judge would have done his lob much better telling the jury" 'Jones brought this
case to court and it is his job to satisfy you that Smith hit him.' True, unlike
the rom-shaking form instruction, the shorter one would have to be recast
and repeated as the charge progressed. 'Smith says that if he hit Jones, he struck
in self-defense. It is Smith's job to satisfy you on that point. "
43. See generally, Panel Discussion Part III Instructing The Jury, 47 CAL.
L.REv. 888 (1959).
